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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
ST A TE OF GEORGIA

BH HASID LLC,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2017CV298598

V.

ARYEH KIEFFER, ADDISON CAPITAL
LLC, and ADDISON ADVISORS LLC,
Bus. Case Div. 1
Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
V.

HASID HOLDINGS, LLC and
RONI AVRAHAM
Counterclaim-Defendants.
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

The above styled matter is before this Court on various pending motions, to wit:
(1) Plaintiffs Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery; (2) Plaintiffs Motion to
Disqualify Jon David Huffman and Defendants' cross-Motion for Attorney's Fees;
(3) Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoena; and (4) Plaintiffs Motion to Quash Notice to
Produce. Having considered the record, the Court finds as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery
Plaintiff filed the instant motion contemporaneously with its Verified Complaint prior to
the transfer of the action to this Court. Insofar as discovery proceeded in this matter shortly after
the transfer, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's motion as MOOT.

(2) Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Jon David Huffman and Defendants' cross-Motion
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for Attorney's Fees

In its Motion to Disqualify, Plaintiff BH Hasid, LLC initially moved the Court to
disqualify Jon David Huffman as counsel for Defendants, citing (a) a conflict of interest arising
from Mr. Huffman having allegedly previously represented Plaintiff with regard to certain
special purpose entities that are the subject of this action, and (b) the fact that Mr. Huffman is a
material witness. In response, Mr. Huffman denies that he had ever represented Plaintiff and
denies that he is a material witness to any of the facts, transactions or documents at issue in this
litigation. Further, Defendants ask the Court for an award of their attorney's fees under O.C.G.A.
§9-15-14(a) and (b) for having to respond to the motion.
In subsequent briefing, Plaintiff "with[drew] without prejudice its Motion to Disqualify
Mr. Huffman based upon the allegations that Mr. Huffman held himself out as counsel for
Plaintiff' but continues "to object to Mr. Huffman's representation of Defendants at trial" and
continues to seek disqualification of Mr. Huffman as trial counsel "to the extent that he is
deemed to be a material witness in this matter."!
Pursuant to Georgia's Rules of Professional Conduct:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be
a necessary witness except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's
firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7
or Rule 1.9.
Ga. R. Prof. Cond. 3.7. Importantly, "[t]he party moving for disqualification of a lawyer under
Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify Jon David Huffman and Opposition to Cross-Motion
for Attorney's Fees, p. 2.
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Rule 3.7 has the burden of showing that the lawyer "is likely to be a necessary witness" by
demonstrating that the lawyer's testimony is relevant to disputed, material questions of fact and
that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts." Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App.
129, 132, 616 S.E.2d 888, 891-92 (2005). See also Lewis v. State, 312 Ga. App. 275, 283, 718

S.E.2d 112, 118 (2011) (quoting Bernacchi v. Forcucci, 279 Ga. 460,462,614 S.E.2d 775, 778
(2005)) ("Because of the right involved and the hardships brought about [by its deprivation],
disqualification of chosen counsel should be seen as an extraordinary remedy and should be
granted sparingly").
Here, the Court finds Plaintiff has not met its burden of establishing that disqualification
1s warranted under Rule 3.7. Specifically, although Mr. Huffman may have had some
involvement in transactions and events leading up to this litigation and Plaintiff asserts he
"potentially" was involved in "the drafting and alleged execution of disputed operating
agreements at issue", no showing has been made that Mr. Huffman's testimony "is relevant to
disputed, material questions of fact and that there is no other evidence available to prove those
facts." Clough, 274 Ga. App. at 132. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify is DENIED at
this time.
With respect to Defendants' cross-Motion for Attorney's Fees, O.C.G.A. §9-15-14
provides in part:
(a) In any civil action in any court of record of this state, reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees and expenses of litigation shall be awarded to
any party against whom another party has asserted a claim, defense, or
other position with respect to which there existed such a complete absence
of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably
believed that a court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other
position ...
(b) The court may assess reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation in any civil action in any court of record if, upon the
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motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party
brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial
justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was interposed for delay
or harassment, or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily
expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct, including, but not
limited to, abuses of discovery procedures available under Chapter 11 of
this title, the "Georgia Civil Practice Act." As used in this Code section,
"lacked substantial justification" means substantially frivolous,
substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.
Here, in light of Defense counsel's involvement in the events leading up to this litigation
and with the entities holding properties that are the subject of this action, the Court finds
Plaintiffs motion presented at least justiciable issues such that an award under O.C.G.A. §9-l 514(a) or (b) is not warranted. Thus, Defendants' cross-Motion for Attorney's Fees is DENIED.

(3) Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoena
O.C.G.A. §24-13-23 provides:
(a) A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to
produce the evidence designated therein.
(b) The court, upon written motion made promptly and in any event at or
before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may:
(1) Quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive; or
(2) Condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in
whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing
the evidence.
As noted by the Georgia Court of Appeals,
[t]his standard "is tested by the peculiar facts arising from the subpoena
itself and other proper sources. [Cits.]" Aycock v. Household Fin.
C01p., 142 Ga.App. 207, 210(3)(b), 235 S.E.2d 578 (1977). "[N]o court
should impose upon the opposite party the onerous task of producing great
quantities of records which have no relevancy. The notice should be
specific enough in its demands to relate the documents sought to the
questions at issue." Horton v. Huiet, 113 Ga.App. 166, 169(1), 147 S.E.2d
669 (1966).
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Washburn v. Sardi's Restaurants, 191 Ga. App. 307, 310, 381 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1989). "(T]he
party moving to quash has the burden of showing that the subpoena is unreasonable and
oppressive." Bazemore v. State, 244 Ga. App. 460,463, 535 S.E.2d 830, 834 (2000).
In the instant motion Defendants Ary eh Kieffer, Addison Capital, LLC and Addison
Advisors, Inc. (collectively "Addison Defendants") move to quash two subpoenas ("Subpoenas")
served by Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendants on Bank of Am erica ("BOA") requesting the
financial information of 16 entities and Defendant Aryeh Kieffer, personally. The Subpoenas
request "all docum ents pertainin g to open or closed checking, savings, trust, or other deposit or
checking accounts held in the name of, for the benefit of, or under the control of [the entities and
Mr. Kieffer, respectively] from January 1, 2012 to present.t" Defendants do not oppose the
Subpoenas to the extent they seek the financial information of the entities that own the properties
at issue in this action ( collectively the "Subsidiaries'Y but ask the Court to quash the Subpoenas
as to all other non-parties and as to the Addison Defendants "because the [S]ubpoenas seek prejudgment disclosure of their personal financial affairs."
Having considered the record and the allegations giving rise to Plaintiffs claims, the
Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion to Quash the Subpoenas served upon the Subsidiaries
and upon each of the Addison Defendants. In its Verified Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants
mismanaged BH Hasid, the Subsidiaries, and the subject properties and that they have failed to
account for funds in excess of $20 million. Particularly given the accounting discrepancies
discussed during the April 11-12, 20 I 8 hearing in this matter, the Court finds the bank
documents requested are directly relevant to the claims and matters at issue in this litigation.
The Subpoenas also seek the financial documents of other non-parties who do not appear
The Subpoenas were not filed with the instant motion.
The Managed Entities include BH Winston Manor, LLC, BH Chamblee, LLC, Addison Hasid IV, LLC,
AdcLison Hasid V, LLC and Addison Hasid VI, LLC.
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to have any involvement in this action, including: IA Daron Village, LLC; IA One Manager,
LLC; FNBA Services, LLC; Addison AGI I, LLC; IA One Investors, LLC; IA Two Manager,
LLC; Mount Vernon, LLC; and IA Two Investors, LLC (collectively the "IA Parties"). Although
the IA Parties appear to be entities with which Defendant Kiefer is involved, given the sensitive,
financial information sought and that no showing has been made that the IA Parties have any
involvement or dealings with Plaintiff or the Subsidiaries, Defendants' Motion to Quash is
GRAN TED at this time with respect to the Subpoenas served upon the IA Parties. If discovery
reveals that assets of Plaintiff or the Subsidiaries have been commin gled with those of the IA
Parties, Plaintiff may seek reconsideration of this ruling, See Blake v. Spears, 254 Ga. App. 21,

23, 561 S.E.2d 173, 176 (2002) (subpoena requiring the defendant produce banking records from
two other businesses he owned not unreasonable because the record reflected that assets of those
business may have been commingled with that of business purchased by the plaintiff and the
requested records were relevant to determine the extent of the comingling).
(4) Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Notice to Produce
Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to quash a Notice to Produce served upon it seeking "any
and all records, documents, and financial or bank statements" relating to BH Hasid's ability to
fund the Subsidiaries.4 In this action, Defendants generally aJlege the Subsidiaries were undercapitalized because, although Plaintiff repeatedly asserted it bad the requisite financial resources,
it failed to sufficiently capitalize the Subsidiaries so as to properly renovate and maintain the
subject properties. Defendants have asserted various counterclaims against Plaintiff BH Hasid
and others, including claims for breach of :fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence
citing, inter alia, the under-capitalization of the Subsidiaries and the allegedly improper
withdrawal of funds in November 2017 by Roni Avraham on behalf of BH Hasid.
The Notice to Produce was not filed with the instant motion.
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Given the foregoing, the Court finds Defendants may obtain standard financial
documents of BH Hasid, including financial statements to the extent available, as well as bank
records, but their request for "any and all records, documents, and financial or bank statements"
relating to BH Hasid's ability to fund the Subsidiaries is unreasonably broad and oppressive.
Further, to the extent Defendants ultimately seek information regarding the personal financial
wealth of BH Hasid's owners, given they are non-parties and in light of the privacy concerns
with requiring nonparties to disclose their personal financial information, the Court finds
Defendants' desire to "substantiate" Plaintiffs assertion that it has access to sufficient capital to
fund the renovations of the Subsidiaries insufficient to justify the requested discovery.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Quash is DENIED IN PART and GRAN TED fN PART, as
limited above.

SO ORDERED this ~~y of May, 2018.

GOGER on behalfof
ER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Served upon registered service contacts through eFileGA

Attornevs for Defendants
Jon David W. Huffman
Scott B. McMahan
POOLE HUFFMAN, LLC
315 W. Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 344
Decatur, GA 30030
Tel: (404) 373-4008
Fax: (888) 709-5723
jondavid@goolehuffman.com
scott@goolehuffman.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
T. Brandon Welch
Enan Stillman
STILLMAN WELCH, LLC
3453 Pierce Drive, Suite 150
Chamblee, GA 30341
Tel: (404) 907-1819
Brandon@stillmanwelch.com
enan@stillmanwelch.com

Steven E. Brust*
SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP
50 North Laura Street
Suite 2600
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Tel: (904) 598-6107
Fax: (904) 598-6207
sbrust@sgrlaw.com

* Admitted pro hac vice
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